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来个新鲜的,MEU的TRAP Team ,当年o'grady 就是他们搜救的

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发表于 2008-1-20 12:30 | 只看该作者 回帖奖励 |倒序浏览 |阅读模式
图片很少,反正偶没搜到,只有几个新闻链接,
26th MEU (SOC) Marines recover downed CH-46E in Northern Iraq
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030427-usmc01.htm

居然还有一篇摘要,说的是“战斗救援任务和usmc战术人员回收(TRAP)任务”,兄弟准备练练手把它翻译了,那位老大给详细讲讲meu的TRAP Team ,怎么空军的pilot要TRAP team救?PJ干什么去了?还有个问题,各军种是不是都有自己的“trap team?”包括海航陆航usmc和空军


Title: The JFC's Dilemma: The USMC TRAP mission verses the Combat SAR mission.

Author: Major Matthew D. Redfern, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Although Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) missions and U.S. Marine Corps
Tactical Recovery of Personnel (TRAP) missions are very similar, they differ in capability.
It is important for joint planners and commanders to understand TRAP and CSAR
differences to task the most capable force to conduct combat rescue or recovery.

Background: The history of CSAR demonstrates the need for detailed planning and
dedicated efforts for combat rescues during war. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
Operations Capable) is very capable force that conducts tactical recovery of aircraft and
personnel. Too often, comanders confuse CSAR with TRAP and task the MEU to
conduct CSAR missions. The U.S. Marine Corps' position on CSAR is that it does not
conduct the search in CSAR. However, the limiting factor is the U. S. Marine Corps
inadequate capability to conduct recovery. Joint doctrine is vague on assigning CSAR
responsibilities contributes to the confusion between CSAR and TRAP. Other service
component's force structure for combat rescue, particularly during OOTW, adds to
the JFC's tasking dilemma. USSOCOM, with its specially equipped aircraft, is the force
normally tasked with theater CSAR even though it detracts from their primary mission.

Recommendation: Joint planners and commanders must understand the difference
between CSAR and TRAP. Joint doctrine needs to combine the capabilities of the service
components with the JFC's requirements to avoid the combat rescue dilemma.





Is TRAP the same as CSAR?



Combat rescues required more than a crew, a helicopter and good


intentions .. men often died attempting a rescue simply because available


crews lacked rescue training and were ignorant of proper recovery


techniques. There was a misconception on the part of some helicopter


crewmen that rescue entailed nothing more than flying over a downed


crewman and picking him up.






-CDR D. G. Hartley, U.S. Navy helicopter pilot1




On 3 September 1992, United Nations' relief flight 2117, an Italian G-222 transport


aircraft, went down near Sarajevo airport from suspected hostile fire in the former country

of Yugoslavia. The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable

MEU(SOC), operating aboard the helicopter carrier USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) in the

Adriatic Sea, received a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) mission

task to rescue or assist any survivors of the Italian G-222. Within two hours after the

receipt of this TRAP mission, two Marine CH-53E heavy lift and two AH-1W attack

helicopters launched for the rescue. For approximately three hours, the aircraft flew over

the war torn area in search of the crash site. Fired upon a minimum of twice during their

flight, the helicopters did not successfully locate the UN 2117 crash site.2 Upon the

helicopters safe return aboard the LPH-2, a postflight inspection of one the CH-53E

helicopter's tail rotor revealed it had taken a hit by groundfire during the mission. The

26th MEU(SOC) was very fortunate it did not lose critical aircraft and personnel during

this mission.


Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, defines combat search


and rescue (CSAR) as "a specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of

distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations."3 The U.S. Marine Corps

defines TRAP as "the capability to conduct overland recovery of downed aircraft and

personnel, aircraft sanitation and provide advanced trama-life support in a benign or

hostile enviromnent."4 Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-35, the Assault Support

Helicopter Tactical Manual, describes TRAP as "a mission performed by an assigned

briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment and/or

aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue assets from responding and

when survivors and there locations have been confirmed."5 The FMFM 5-35 definition of

TRAP makes the assumption that TRAP is a mission solely performed by helicopters.

Although Joint Pub 3-50.2's definition of TRAP is similar to FMFM 5-35's definition,

a disclaimer exists in their glossary that its definition not be referenced outside the JCS

publication.6 However, it is clear from the first two definitions that CSAR is the rescue of

only personnel while TRAP is the recovery of personnel and equipment.


The MEU(SOC) is a task oriented, self-sustainable, and amphibious Marine Air Ground


Task Force (MAGTF). The MEU(SOC) is capable of conventional and selected maritime

special operations of limited-duration in support of a combatant commander's mission.

The TRAP mission is one tasked performed by the MEU(SOC).7 The 26th MEU(SOC)'s

mission on 3 September 1992, was a CSAR mission vice a TRAP mission. As a derivative

of CSAR, joint planners and commanders frequently misunderstand the Marine Corps'

TRAP mission as equivalent to CSAR. Contributing to the confusion are vague

definitions of CSAR and TRAP. The vague definitions combined with each service

component's diverse approach to rescue operations, leads to tasking problems of combat

rescue and recovery missions. The decisive factor in delineating between the two terms is

the location and execution of the search and recovery.
For a better understanding of the


differences between recovery and search and rescue, it is important to discuss and explore

the history of search and rescue as it influenced the Marine Corps development of the

TRAP mission.







History of Search and Rescue



During World War II (WWII), the German Luftwaffe, under Reich Marshal Hermann


Goering, developed the first search and rescue efforts for their pilots during the Battle of

Britain.
In the air battles over the English Channel, the airmen of the Battle of Britain


often found themselves in a predicament of attempting to fly a crippled aircraft to shore or

bail out into dangerous waters of the English Channel.
The Germans made a conscious


and determined effort to rescue downed Luftwaffe pilots from the English Channel.
The


Germans used rescue floats, anchored approximately two miles off the coast of France, to

keep the downed German airmen warm and sheltered until rescued by a friendly ship.

These rescue floats contained blankets, rations and medical supplies to aid in the downed

airman's survival while he awaited rescue.8 In the event of a rescue fleet of the Heinkel-59

seaplanes.
The Heinkel-59 was a medical supply float plane that would locate the downed


Luftwaffe pilots usually through identification of their pilot flares, yellow skull-caps and

visible one-man dinghies.9
The Germans soon quickly learned that painting large red


crosses on the wings of the white Heinkel-59 did not prevent the Royal Air Force (RAF)

from attacking.
The British felt that attacking the Heinkel-59 aircraft prevented the


Luftwaffe's pilots from returning to combat.
The Germans learned that these rescues were


actually combat rescues. So thereafter, they painted the float planes camouflage colors and

used Messerschmitts Bf 109s to escort and provide cover during the rescue.


The British took a different approach and did not plan recovery operations for downed


RAF pilots. They relied on chance spotting of a downed airman by a ship or an airplane.

The RAF pilot only had a "Mae West" life Jacket to keep him afloat and hope a ship or

plane saw him go down. Even if a ship or plane saw him go down in the English Channel,

the pilot only had about two hours of consciousness before hypothermia set in because of

the icy channel waters. In just three weeks during July 1940, the British lost more than

220 RAF airmen at sea.10 These losses of airmen persuaded the RAF to develop their own

procedures for search and rescue. The British would preposition special observation

aircraft to locate the downed airmen and radio to offshore rescue boats to direct his

pick-up. Similar to the Germans, the RAF began to issue the pilots flares and fluorescine

dye to assist the observation plane in locating the downed aviators. These measures

proved to be effective. As fighting increased in the following months during the Battle of

Britain, the RAF lost fewer airmen to the sea.11


World War II witnessed the development of various forms of search and rescue in both


the Pacific and Europe. The partisan underground, float planes, coast watchers and

submarines, played a vital role in the rescue of many downed airmen. In fact, in the

Pacific Ocean, after the shoot down of his Torpedo Bomber Avenger during the attack

of the island of Chichi Jima, a submarine rescued former President and Naval Aviator,

George Bush.12 Although World War II saw numerous innovations in combat rescue, the

fundamental lesson learned was the importance of the planned rescue effort. A

well planned rescue effort resulted in a successful recovery of personnel.





Korea



Although the first military helicopter rescues occurred in Burma during WWII,


the Korean war witnessed the first extensive use of helicopters in rescue operations. Korean

War helicopter rescue operations taught three major lessons. First, that control of the air

is essential to conduct a helicopter recovery. Military helicopters are vulnerable from

anti-air attack and rely on air superiority to operate under. Second, that the rescue vehicle

must be long range capable and able to fly anywhere on the battlefield. During the Korean

War, the U.S. Air Force upgraded their Sikorsky H-5 helicopters to the longer range and

more capable Sikorsky H-19 helicopters. This upgrade enabled the USAF to range the

entire battlefield by a helicopter. Third, that downed pilots, utilizing the new URC-4

emergency radio, assisted the search effort in locating the survivor behind enemy lines.13

The radio eliminated the requirement of dangerous visual search missions in enemy

controlled areas. These three lessons enabled the U.S. Air Force to rescue 170

aircrewmen out of 1690 aircrewmen shot down during the Korean War.14





Vietnam



Every "downed" pilot hopes heaven and earth will be moved in order to

effect his rescue, but this pilot was one of the few successfully plucked

from the waters of Vietnam. Rescue concepts used by the Navy in Vietnam


were woefully inadequate--not as a result of inability but because of


studied neglect by the Navy. This is a historical reality, and it is


inexcusable.







-CDR D. G. Hartley, USN15




With the advancement of military helicopter technology, search and rescue took on a


different dimension. The helicopter enabled the commander to deploy a rescue asset

rapidly anywhere in the theater to recover a downed airman. Given the terrain and dense

jungles of Vietnam, the Vietnam War was the golden age of helicopter search and rescue.

The services began using the helicopter as the primary vehicle of search and rescue. Its

greatest advantages, flexibility and mobility, were also its greatest deficiencies. The over

dependence on them helicopter's flexibility and mobility led rescue planners to neglect the

thorough and detailed planning required for effective combat search and rescue.


Due to detailed planning, the U. S. Air Force's search and rescue had a better rescue


record than the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps. Fifty percent of the 321 Naval aviators

shot down in North Vietnam survived the downing. Of the 161 aviators that did survive,

the U.S. Navy and Marine only rescued 16 percent while the Vietnamese captured the

remainder.16 For every 1.4 recovery made, the Navy and Marines lost one rescue

aircraft. For every 1.8 recovery made, the Navy and Marines lost a rescuer.17 This high

turnover of pilots and aircraft is simply unacceptable.


Concurrently, the U. S. Air Force had 2700 pilots and aircrewmen downed over


Vietnam and recovered 980 of them. The recovery percentage is twice the rate of the

U.S. Navy and Marine Corps' rate. The USAF made 4.5 rescues for every rescue aircraft

lost and 9.2 rescues for every rescuer lost.18 One of the largest reasons for the USAF's

higher recovery rate over that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps' recovery rate was the

USAF's approach to search and rescue.



The USAF first located and authenticated the survivor. Then they planned a detailed


rescue effort. Finally, they executed their preplanned rescue. The Navy and Marine

Corps, on the other hand, often conducted brash and "ad hoc" recoveries that usually

ended in failure.


Of the captured downed airmen in Vietnam, 8 0% were on the ground only 30 minutes


before being captured.19 During these first thirty minutes, sufficient time to plan and

execute a successful rescue mission -did not exist. If they survived the first thirty minutes,

the downed airmen had hours and even days to evade the enemy. After the first thirty

minutes, while the downed airman was escaping and evading (E&E), there was the time to

locate and attempt a rescue. During this E&E stage, the mission planners could

specifically and effectively plan. Commander Daniel G. Hartley, a helicopter pilot in

Vietnam, said, "This fact was obvious from the outset but was ignored by the Navy

planners."20
The Navy lost too many personnel and aircraft because of their hastily


launched helicopter rescue attempts. Essentially, the military needed to relearned the same

lessons of WWII and Korea during the Vietnam War. It was obvious by the end of the

war that search and rescue under combat conditions needed to become a specified task of

combat SAR.





Desert Storm/Shield



During the 1980's, all the services developed the concept of combat SAR vice


peacetime SAR. The Vietnam experience taught us that CSAR is a requirement of

conventional warfare, yet requires special equipment and trained crews over that of

peacetime SAR. Because of these lessons of Vietnam, most of services believe that CSAR

is a function of Special Operation Forces (SOF) during hostilities. During Desert

Shield/Storm, USCINCCENT tasked SOCCENT with CSAR because "SOF possessed the

best capability in theater to conduct long range recovery missions given the threat in the

KTO."21 However, U.S. Special Operations Command's (US SOCOM) primary mission is

unconventional warfare, not CSAR. Every asset that SOF dedicates for CSAR, takes

away from their available assets for unconventional warfare. Although the specially

trained SOF units conducted CSAR during Desert Shield/Storm, the recovery results

remained relatively the same as previous conflicts.


Of the 52 downed airmen during Desert Shield/Storm, only 22 survived. Of these 22


survivors, the Iraqis immediately captured fourteen. Five survivors evaded capture for 3

to 48 hours. U. S. military forces rescued only three aircrew. With one UH-60

Blackhawk lost and five personnel killed in action attempting a rescue, three of the eight

CSAR missions launched were successful.22


The lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm indicate that the U.S. military is still


conducting "ad hoc" CSAR missions. CSAR should be the responsibility of all the

services not just USSOCOM. The military addressed these deficiencies and developed

Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, in July 1994.





USMC TRAP



In the late 1970s, as a result of the Vietnam experience, the U.S. Marine Corps


established Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS- 1) to

standardize aircrew training throughout the aviation community. Well aware of the

history of combat rescue, MAWTS-1 recognized that CSAR requires a consecrated effort

and specifically trained personnel. MAWTS-1 taught aviators that USMC CSAR requires

dedicated rescue assets be held in reserve during an operation. The Marine Corps could ill

afford to spare the aviation assets necessary to dedicate for CSAR. Furthermore, in a joint

and combined environment, this CSAR mission would conflict with the accomplishment of

the MAGTF's primary mission. In 1987, the Marine Corps changed their rescue doctrine

to TRAP vice CSAR. The stated reason for the change was that the Marine Corps does

not conduct the "search" portion in CSAR. Joint Pub 3-50.2 collaborates this position by

stating; "MAGTFs do not routinely train to conduct the search portion of CSAR."23

However, search is not the key term in CSAR; it is rescue.


First of all, CSAR does not mean that a helicopter must accomplish the entire mission.


An E-3 AWACS, fighter aircraft or national asset can normally conduct the search for a

downed airman. Ground reconnaissance forces or anyone capable of receiving a downed

pilot's radio distress signal can also conduct the search for a downed airman. The

probability that the search portion of CSAR executed by a helicopter is very low because

very few helicopters operate deep within the battlespace.


With the arguable exception of the AH-1W Corbra, USMC helicopters by design do


not permit operations too far beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL).24

However, the Marine Corps has assets, such as, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), that

could conduct the deep search function, if required. National, theater, host nation and

other component's intelligence resources can also conduct the search function. It is

important to remember that TRAP evolved prior to the deployment of the UAV and the

Marine Corps ability to utilize national search level assets at the MEU level. In today's

joint environment, the Marine Corps should have access to these important assets in any

given theater.
(一)

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2
发表于 2008-1-20 20:46 | 只看该作者
LZ是来考验我的E文的....
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3
发表于 2008-1-25 14:01 | 只看该作者
那架海上骑士是陆战队的,由陆战队搜救理所当然。
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4
发表于 2008-1-25 20:16 | 只看该作者
三级半的水平,我承认我看不懂。
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5
发表于 2008-1-31 22:52 | 只看该作者
一般来说,这样的东西没人会翻译的。
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