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图片很少，反正偶没搜到，只有几个新闻链接，
26th MEU (SOC) Marines recover downed CH-46E in Northern Iraq
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030427-usmc01.htm
居然还有一篇摘要，说的是“战斗救援任务和usmc战术人员回收(TRAP)任务”，兄弟准备练练手把它翻译了，那位老大给详细讲讲meu的TRAP Team ，怎么空军的pilot要TRAP team救？PJ干什么去了？还有个问题，各军种是不是都有自己的“trap team?”包括海航陆航usmc和空军
Title: The JFC's Dilemma: The USMC TRAP mission verses the Combat SAR mission.
Author: Major Matthew D. Redfern, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: Although Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) missions and U.S. Marine Corps
Tactical Recovery of Personnel (TRAP) missions are very similar, they differ in capability.
It is important for joint planners and commanders to understand TRAP and CSAR
differences to task the most capable force to conduct combat rescue or recovery.
Background: The history of CSAR demonstrates the need for detailed planning and
dedicated efforts for combat rescues during war. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
Operations Capable) is very capable force that conducts tactical recovery of aircraft and
personnel. Too often, comanders confuse CSAR with TRAP and task the MEU to
conduct CSAR missions. The U.S. Marine Corps' position on CSAR is that it does not
conduct the search in CSAR. However, the limiting factor is the U. S. Marine Corps
inadequate capability to conduct recovery. Joint doctrine is vague on assigning CSAR
responsibilities contributes to the confusion between CSAR and TRAP. Other service
component's force structure for combat rescue, particularly during OOTW, adds to
the JFC's tasking dilemma. USSOCOM, with its specially equipped aircraft, is the force
normally tasked with theater CSAR even though it detracts from their primary mission.
Recommendation: Joint planners and commanders must understand the difference
between CSAR and TRAP. Joint doctrine needs to combine the capabilities of the service
components with the JFC's requirements to avoid the combat rescue dilemma.
Is TRAP the same as CSAR?
Combat rescues required more than a crew, a helicopter and good
intentions .. men often died attempting a rescue simply because available
crews lacked rescue training and were ignorant of proper recovery
techniques. There was a misconception on the part of some helicopter
crewmen that rescue entailed nothing more than flying over a downed
crewman and picking him up.
-CDR D. G. Hartley, U.S. Navy helicopter pilot1
On 3 September 1992, United Nations' relief flight 2117, an Italian G-222 transport
aircraft, went down near Sarajevo airport from suspected hostile fire in the former country
of Yugoslavia. The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable
MEU(SOC), operating aboard the helicopter carrier USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) in the
Adriatic Sea, received a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) mission
task to rescue or assist any survivors of the Italian G-222. Within two hours after the
receipt of this TRAP mission, two Marine CH-53E heavy lift and two AH-1W attack
helicopters launched for the rescue. For approximately three hours, the aircraft flew over
the war torn area in search of the crash site. Fired upon a minimum of twice during their
flight, the helicopters did not successfully locate the UN 2117 crash site.2 Upon the
helicopters safe return aboard the LPH-2, a postflight inspection of one the CH-53E
helicopter's tail rotor revealed it had taken a hit by groundfire during the mission. The
26th MEU(SOC) was very fortunate it did not lose critical aircraft and personnel during
this mission.
Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, defines combat search
and rescue (CSAR) as "a specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of
distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations."3 The U.S. Marine Corps
defines TRAP as "the capability to conduct overland recovery of downed aircraft and
personnel, aircraft sanitation and provide advanced trama-life support in a benign or
hostile enviromnent."4 Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-35, the Assault Support
Helicopter Tactical Manual, describes TRAP as "a mission performed by an assigned
briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment and/or
aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue assets from responding and
when survivors and there locations have been confirmed."5 The FMFM 5-35 definition of
TRAP makes the assumption that TRAP is a mission solely performed by helicopters.
Although Joint Pub 3-50.2's definition of TRAP is similar to FMFM 5-35's definition,
a disclaimer exists in their glossary that its definition not be referenced outside the JCS
publication.6 However, it is clear from the first two definitions that CSAR is the rescue of
only personnel while TRAP is the recovery of personnel and equipment.
The MEU(SOC) is a task oriented, self-sustainable, and amphibious Marine Air Ground
Task Force (MAGTF). The MEU(SOC) is capable of conventional and selected maritime
special operations of limited-duration in support of a combatant commander's mission.
The TRAP mission is one tasked performed by the MEU(SOC).7 The 26th MEU(SOC)'s
mission on 3 September 1992, was a CSAR mission vice a TRAP mission. As a derivative
of CSAR, joint planners and commanders frequently misunderstand the Marine Corps'
TRAP mission as equivalent to CSAR. Contributing to the confusion are vague
definitions of CSAR and TRAP. The vague definitions combined with each service
component's diverse approach to rescue operations, leads to tasking problems of combat
rescue and recovery missions. The decisive factor in delineating between the two terms is
the location and execution of the search and recovery.
For a better understanding of the
differences between recovery and search and rescue, it is important to discuss and explore
the history of search and rescue as it influenced the Marine Corps development of the
TRAP mission.
History of Search and Rescue
During World War II (WWII), the German Luftwaffe, under Reich Marshal Hermann
Goering, developed the first search and rescue efforts for their pilots during the Battle of
Britain.
In the air battles over the English Channel, the airmen of the Battle of Britain
often found themselves in a predicament of attempting to fly a crippled aircraft to shore or
bail out into dangerous waters of the English Channel.
The Germans made a conscious
and determined effort to rescue downed Luftwaffe pilots from the English Channel.
The
Germans used rescue floats, anchored approximately two miles off the coast of France, to
keep the downed German airmen warm and sheltered until rescued by a friendly ship.
These rescue floats contained blankets, rations and medical supplies to aid in the downed
airman's survival while he awaited rescue.8 In the event of a rescue fleet of the Heinkel-59
seaplanes.
The Heinkel-59 was a medical supply float plane that would locate the downed
Luftwaffe pilots usually through identification of their pilot flares, yellow skull-caps and
visible one-man dinghies.9
The Germans soon quickly learned that painting large red
crosses on the wings of the white Heinkel-59 did not prevent the Royal Air Force (RAF)
from attacking.
The British felt that attacking the Heinkel-59 aircraft prevented the
Luftwaffe's pilots from returning to combat.
The Germans learned that these rescues were
actually combat rescues. So thereafter, they painted the float planes camouflage colors and
used Messerschmitts Bf 109s to escort and provide cover during the rescue.
The British took a different approach and did not plan recovery operations for downed
RAF pilots. They relied on chance spotting of a downed airman by a ship or an airplane.
The RAF pilot only had a "Mae West" life Jacket to keep him afloat and hope a ship or
plane saw him go down. Even if a ship or plane saw him go down in the English Channel,
the pilot only had about two hours of consciousness before hypothermia set in because of
the icy channel waters. In just three weeks during July 1940, the British lost more than
220 RAF airmen at sea.10 These losses of airmen persuaded the RAF to develop their own
procedures for search and rescue. The British would preposition special observation
aircraft to locate the downed airmen and radio to offshore rescue boats to direct his
pick-up. Similar to the Germans, the RAF began to issue the pilots flares and fluorescine
dye to assist the observation plane in locating the downed aviators. These measures
proved to be effective. As fighting increased in the following months during the Battle of
Britain, the RAF lost fewer airmen to the sea.11
World War II witnessed the development of various forms of search and rescue in both
the Pacific and Europe. The partisan underground, float planes, coast watchers and
submarines, played a vital role in the rescue of many downed airmen. In fact, in the
Pacific Ocean, after the shoot down of his Torpedo Bomber Avenger during the attack
of the island of Chichi Jima, a submarine rescued former President and Naval Aviator,
George Bush.12 Although World War II saw numerous innovations in combat rescue, the
fundamental lesson learned was the importance of the planned rescue effort. A
well planned rescue effort resulted in a successful recovery of personnel.
Korea
Although the first military helicopter rescues occurred in Burma during WWII,
the Korean war witnessed the first extensive use of helicopters in rescue operations. Korean
War helicopter rescue operations taught three major lessons. First, that control of the air
is essential to conduct a helicopter recovery. Military helicopters are vulnerable from
anti-air attack and rely on air superiority to operate under. Second, that the rescue vehicle
must be long range capable and able to fly anywhere on the battlefield. During the Korean
War, the U.S. Air Force upgraded their Sikorsky H-5 helicopters to the longer range and
more capable Sikorsky H-19 helicopters. This upgrade enabled the USAF to range the
entire battlefield by a helicopter. Third, that downed pilots, utilizing the new URC-4
emergency radio, assisted the search effort in locating the survivor behind enemy lines.13
The radio eliminated the requirement of dangerous visual search missions in enemy
controlled areas. These three lessons enabled the U.S. Air Force to rescue 170
aircrewmen out of 1690 aircrewmen shot down during the Korean War.14
Vietnam
Every "downed" pilot hopes heaven and earth will be moved in order to
effect his rescue, but this pilot was one of the few successfully plucked
from the waters of Vietnam. Rescue concepts used by the Navy in Vietnam
were woefully inadequate--not as a result of inability but because of
studied neglect by the Navy. This is a historical reality, and it is
inexcusable.
-CDR D. G. Hartley, USN15
With the advancement of military helicopter technology, search and rescue took on a
different dimension. The helicopter enabled the commander to deploy a rescue asset
rapidly anywhere in the theater to recover a downed airman. Given the terrain and dense
jungles of Vietnam, the Vietnam War was the golden age of helicopter search and rescue.
The services began using the helicopter as the primary vehicle of search and rescue. Its
greatest advantages, flexibility and mobility, were also its greatest deficiencies. The over
dependence on them helicopter's flexibility and mobility led rescue planners to neglect the
thorough and detailed planning required for effective combat search and rescue.
Due to detailed planning, the U. S. Air Force's search and rescue had a better rescue
record than the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps. Fifty percent of the 321 Naval aviators
shot down in North Vietnam survived the downing. Of the 161 aviators that did survive,
the U.S. Navy and Marine only rescued 16 percent while the Vietnamese captured the
remainder.16 For every 1.4 recovery made, the Navy and Marines lost one rescue
aircraft. For every 1.8 recovery made, the Navy and Marines lost a rescuer.17 This high
turnover of pilots and aircraft is simply unacceptable.
Concurrently, the U. S. Air Force had 2700 pilots and aircrewmen downed over
Vietnam and recovered 980 of them. The recovery percentage is twice the rate of the
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps' rate. The USAF made 4.5 rescues for every rescue aircraft
lost and 9.2 rescues for every rescuer lost.18 One of the largest reasons for the USAF's
higher recovery rate over that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps' recovery rate was the
USAF's approach to search and rescue.
The USAF first located and authenticated the survivor. Then they planned a detailed
rescue effort. Finally, they executed their preplanned rescue. The Navy and Marine
Corps, on the other hand, often conducted brash and "ad hoc" recoveries that usually
ended in failure.
Of the captured downed airmen in Vietnam, 8 0% were on the ground only 30 minutes
before being captured.19 During these first thirty minutes, sufficient time to plan and
execute a successful rescue mission -did not exist. If they survived the first thirty minutes,
the downed airmen had hours and even days to evade the enemy. After the first thirty
minutes, while the downed airman was escaping and evading (E&E), there was the time to
locate and attempt a rescue. During this E&E stage, the mission planners could
specifically and effectively plan. Commander Daniel G. Hartley, a helicopter pilot in
Vietnam, said, "This fact was obvious from the outset but was ignored by the Navy
planners."20
The Navy lost too many personnel and aircraft because of their hastily
launched helicopter rescue attempts. Essentially, the military needed to relearned the same
lessons of WWII and Korea during the Vietnam War. It was obvious by the end of the
war that search and rescue under combat conditions needed to become a specified task of
combat SAR.
Desert Storm/Shield
During the 1980's, all the services developed the concept of combat SAR vice
peacetime SAR. The Vietnam experience taught us that CSAR is a requirement of
conventional warfare, yet requires special equipment and trained crews over that of
peacetime SAR. Because of these lessons of Vietnam, most of services believe that CSAR
is a function of Special Operation Forces (SOF) during hostilities. During Desert
Shield/Storm, USCINCCENT tasked SOCCENT with CSAR because "SOF possessed the
best capability in theater to conduct long range recovery missions given the threat in the
KTO."21 However, U.S. Special Operations Command's (US SOCOM) primary mission is
unconventional warfare, not CSAR. Every asset that SOF dedicates for CSAR, takes
away from their available assets for unconventional warfare. Although the specially
trained SOF units conducted CSAR during Desert Shield/Storm, the recovery results
remained relatively the same as previous conflicts.
Of the 52 downed airmen during Desert Shield/Storm, only 22 survived. Of these 22
survivors, the Iraqis immediately captured fourteen. Five survivors evaded capture for 3
to 48 hours. U. S. military forces rescued only three aircrew. With one UH-60
Blackhawk lost and five personnel killed in action attempting a rescue, three of the eight
CSAR missions launched were successful.22
The lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm indicate that the U.S. military is still
conducting "ad hoc" CSAR missions. CSAR should be the responsibility of all the
services not just USSOCOM. The military addressed these deficiencies and developed
Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, in July 1994.
USMC TRAP
In the late 1970s, as a result of the Vietnam experience, the U.S. Marine Corps
established Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS- 1) to
standardize aircrew training throughout the aviation community. Well aware of the
history of combat rescue, MAWTS-1 recognized that CSAR requires a consecrated effort
and specifically trained personnel. MAWTS-1 taught aviators that USMC CSAR requires
dedicated rescue assets be held in reserve during an operation. The Marine Corps could ill
afford to spare the aviation assets necessary to dedicate for CSAR. Furthermore, in a joint
and combined environment, this CSAR mission would conflict with the accomplishment of
the MAGTF's primary mission. In 1987, the Marine Corps changed their rescue doctrine
to TRAP vice CSAR. The stated reason for the change was that the Marine Corps does
not conduct the "search" portion in CSAR. Joint Pub 3-50.2 collaborates this position by
stating; "MAGTFs do not routinely train to conduct the search portion of CSAR."23
However, search is not the key term in CSAR; it is rescue.
First of all, CSAR does not mean that a helicopter must accomplish the entire mission.
An E-3 AWACS, fighter aircraft or national asset can normally conduct the search for a
downed airman. Ground reconnaissance forces or anyone capable of receiving a downed
pilot's radio distress signal can also conduct the search for a downed airman. The
probability that the search portion of CSAR executed by a helicopter is very low because
very few helicopters operate deep within the battlespace.
With the arguable exception of the AH-1W Corbra, USMC helicopters by design do
not permit operations too far beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL).24
However, the Marine Corps has assets, such as, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), that
could conduct the deep search function, if required. National, theater, host nation and
other component's intelligence resources can also conduct the search function. It is
important to remember that TRAP evolved prior to the deployment of the UAV and the
Marine Corps ability to utilize national search level assets at the MEU level. In today's
joint environment, the Marine Corps should have access to these important assets in any
given theater.
（一）
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发表于 2008-1-20 12:30
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